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The American Mission
Michael A. Ledeen
American leaders cannot conduct foreign policy the way others do, 
because America is a very different kind of country, and the American 
people are very different from others. Yes, I know that all countries are 
different, but America is more different.
To begin with, America is amazingly lucky. Our good luck begins 
with our fortunate location. Our two big oceans make invasion by 
would-be conquerors almost impossible, which is why we have nearly 
always felt invulnerable to direct attack. Moreover, our land is not 
only remote from danger but good for planting, harvesting, digging 
and drilling. We’ve got rich farmland and fabulous natural resources, 
from precious minerals to big, strong rivers and abundant forests. Our 
national psychoanalyst, Alexis de Tocqueville, thinks that this enor-
mous natural abundance is the primeval basis for American democ-
racy: “Not only is legislation democratic, but Nature herself favors the 
cause of the people.”1 He, like most Americans, looks upon America as 
a Divine gift, offered to us at the precise moment when mankind had 
learned how to exploit natural riches, and needed the space to create 
“an asylum for repose and freedom. Just then North America was dis-
covered, as if it had been kept in reserve by the Deity and had just risen 
from beneath the waters of the Deluge.”
Our luck continues with our neighbors, who have neither the desire 
nor the means to threaten our survival. Our first neighbors, the Indi-
ans, were easily driven out of the lands we craved, and then reduced 
to misery. Our subsequent and present neighbors, the Canadians and 
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the Mexicans, threaten us only with cheap labor and low-cost goods, 
not with armed aggression. No wonder we have great difficulty under-
standing most other countries, which are bounded by hostile neigh-
bors with large appetites.
Imagine if we had the Red Army across the border to the north, and 
a big Syria, armed to the teeth, on the far side of the Rio Grande! We 
wouldn’t have the luxury to indulge in our many political and social 
experiments; we’d be worried about making it to next year in good 
shape. As it is, we’re so “laid back” that we’re blissfully unconcerned 
about the emerging military might of the People’s Republic of China, 
even though the Chinese regime makes it quite clear that it intends to 
challenge us once it has become powerful enough.
Our enemies are far away, our neighbors are friendly, and we’re 
doing very well. Why worry about the rest of the world? For a long 
time, nearly a century and a half after the Founding, we really didn’t 
think much about the rest of the world. Now we do worry, albeit only 
when the world intrudes, and even then in a peculiar, conflicted way. 
We have a love/hate relationship with the outside world. We hate it 
and fear it, because most of us came from some foreign country where 
we were treated badly, and we came to America believing that we 
would find something better for ourselves and our children. For the 
most part, we succeeded, and we all believe, deep within our national 
genome, that things are better here, and there is danger of contamina-
tion back where we came from. With rare exceptions, the only happy 
American expatriates are intellectuals who resent American success. 
The great movement of people is into America, not out of it.
The past century has driven home that instinctive dread because 
we were dragged into three world wars (World War I, World War II, 
and the Cold War) and two “peacekeeping missions” in Europe, at an 
enormous cost in money and blood. Although we saved the Europeans 
from their own suicidal inclinations, we were contaminated by them, 
above all in the growth of a centralized state that the Founders tried so 
desperately to prevent.
Yet we also love the Old World, and not only in our secret yearning 
for royalty and aristocracy that occasionally bursts into blind infatua-
tion with families like the Kennedys, or the importation, stone by stone, 
of London Bridge to the banks of a river in Arizona. Luigi Barzini, 
who was raised in a society replete with aristocrats and royal families, 
sniffed it out with his usual elegance: “the compulsive and impatient 
rush toward the West, the ever-retreating perfect future, always went 
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with an aching and disproportionate yearning for the East, the past 
they did not have or had rejected.”2
To this built-in ambivalence toward the outside world, we add an 
ideological conflict. We believe we have created the best political sys-
tem and we want to see the rest of the world adopt it. We are the 
most successfully revolutionary nation in the world, and we believe in 
exporting our democratic revolution. Of course we want our leaders to 
support opponents of tyranny. Call it the Jeffersonian impulse.
But we also believe, with nearly equal passion, that it is wrong to 
meddle in the internal affairs of other countries. This conviction com-
bines with our dread of foreign contamination to make it very difficult 
for the United States to use its power overseas until and unless some 
dramatic event occurs. Call it the Washingtonian persuasion.
The debate between Jefferson and Washington is part of our national 
DNA, because we revere them both and agree with both. It is not so 
much a debate between the partisans of one or the other as it is an 
internal conflict within the soul of every American.3
*****
These two conflicting passions help explain why, when we do get 
involved, we generally convince ourselves that we are engaged 
in a righteous crusade. The conviction that we are doing the Lord’s 
work helps us paper over the underlying tension that has invariably 
exploded in our political debates over foreign intervention. We never 
think in the old traditional European terms of advancing our national 
interest: we wage holy wars or we don’t fight at all. Whenever we have 
leaders who fancy themselves masters of statecraft and try to conduct 
a purely pragmatic foreign policy they come to ruin. The American 
people will not long tolerate it, as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
found to their dismay. No matter how brilliant the stratagems, Ameri-
cans need to believe that they are “engaged in a crusade to improve 
not their life alone but the whole world.”4
The same righteousness governs our long periods of isolation, 
which we justify by an appeal to our moral and material superiority, 
combined with fear of contamination from the corrupt outside world. 
So whichever passion has the upper hand, we tend to have a total 
commitment: All or nothing; either a grand crusade or splendid isola-
tion. And we are quite capable of violent mood swings, as in Somalia, 
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where we first hurled ourselves into action, then turned on a dime and 
withdrew.
The rest of the world almost never understands this. It baffles and 
frustrates our friends and allies, and fools and tempts our enemies. A 
European foreign minister once said to me that he could live with a 
hawkish or a dovish America, but he could not cope with an America 
that constantly changed its mind. I understood his frustration and 
sympathized with it. But he could not have his wish. It’s tough to be 
our ally sometimes.
Secure in our boundaries, confident of God’s blessings, we invari-
ably wait until the very last minute, paralyzed by the tug-of-war that 
exists within every American. We do not feel obliged, as do normal 
countries, to constantly prepare for the next war. We have never been 
ready for the next war. As far back as 1846, when we were on the verge 
of launching a two-front war to expand into Texas, California, and 
Oregon, the Congress was planning to close the Military Academy at 
West Point, thereby establishing a pattern that still shapes our deci-
sions. Whenever a war is over, we dismantle our military establish-
ment because we are the first people in human history to believe, in 
the teeth of all historical evidence, that peace is the normal condition of 
mankind and war is an aberration. The very opposite is true.
When I was a graduate student, I was required to read a book about 
the 19th century called The Great Transformation. Early in the first chap-
ter, we find:
The nineteenth century produced a phenomenon unheard of in the 
annals of Western civilization, namely, a hundred years’ peace—1815–
1914. Apart from the Crimean War—a more or less colonial event—Eng-
land, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war 
among each other for altogether only eighteen months. A computation of 
comparable figures for the two preceding centuries gives an average of 
sixty to seventy years of major wars in each.5
Of course, Polanyi notes that there were wars in that century, most 
notably the Franco-Prussian War, but there was no really big war, noth-
ing on the scale of the three world wars in the next century or the conti-
nental conflicts of the preceding several hundred years that culminated 
in the global wars revolving around revolutionary and then Napole-
onic France. Historians therefore marveled at the rare tranquility of 
the period from the Congress of Vienna to the outbreak of the First 
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World War. You really need no other example to understand the odd-
ity of peace and the ubiquity of war. If you want another illustration, 
however, reflect on the fact that the present moment is one of the most 
peaceful in decades. There are fewer wars and fewer people killed in 
war. Yet I dare say most people believe we are unfortunate to live in 
such a dangerous time. Most of us think we are living in an unusually 
violent time, even though the data show the opposite.
Convinced that peace is normal, that wars are infrequent, and that 
America only fights wars to remove evil itself from the face of the earth, 
we are always candidates for a “sucker punch.” Consider the last cen-
tury: We were torpedoed into the First World War by Germany on the 
North Atlantic; we were providentially bombed into the Second World 
War by the Japanese; we were dragged into the Cold War by Stalin’s 
expansionist appetites; we were catalyzed into the first Gulf War by 
Saddam’s misjudged advance into Kuwait; and we were shocked into 
the war against terror by the events of September 11, 2001.
Barring such exceptional circumstances, we shun military prepa-
rations and ignore the ancient advice: “If you want peace, prepare 
for war.” Neither the long centuries of human history nor our own 
national experience convinces us otherwise. Whenever war is over, 
we alchemically transform guns to butter and pretend to go back to 
“normal,” namely, the abnormal and temporary period known as 
peace. During peacetime, our political and military leadership declines 
because, unlike most traditional countries, the most talented people in 
America rarely go into politics or the military. They go into business or 
the professions.
Yet, in another of those paradoxes that strain the American soul, 
we rather like war, and we love successful military heroes. With rare 
exceptions, our presidents have either been state governors or generals 
who have won wars, from George Washington to Andrew Jackson to 
Dwight Eisenhower. As recently as this past year, there was consider-
able support—from a political party largely hostile to war—for Gen-
eral Wesley Clark, although he served in only a minor war in Kosovo. 
Furthermore, Senator Kerry embodied both sides of our ambivalence, 
having fought in war and opposed it thereafter. And four years ago, 
retired General Colin Powell decided not to run for the White House, 
although he quite likely would have been elected. He remains the 
single most popular figure in American political life.
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*****
Foreign policy has always been the greatest weakness of American 
democracy, as Tocqueville saw nearly two hundred years ago:
[A] democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an 
important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its 
execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures 
with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are quali-
ties which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and 
they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an individual, 
attains a dominant position.6
It’s very hard for us to define a long-term strategy, and harder still to 
conduct it with patience and perseverance. We’re an impatient people 
in all aspects of national life. Corporate executives are under constant 
pressure to produce results, and quickly, even if it might make more 
sense for the company to sacrifice short-term gains for far greater mid-
dle- or long-term profit. No go. Shareholders and fund managers want 
to see large black numbers on the bottom line every quarter. So it is in 
foreign affairs; we expect our leaders to deliver positive results, and 
fast. If we invest men and money in a particular policy objective, we 
want a good, speedy return. The electoral cycle sets the basic rhythm 
for foreign policy, and, unless we are in a clearly perceived interna-
tional struggle, even a president who is prepared to sacrifice the inter-
ests of his party to a greater national good has to produce good news 
within four years. Never mind that it is often prudent to spend money 
for weapons that are never used, or that governments are supposed 
to protect us against worst-case scenarios that hardly ever happen, 
instead of having to react to crises when they arise. Finally, the requi-
site secrecy of which Tocqueville writes is almost impossible to sus-
tain in modern democracies, and utterly impossible in contemporary 
America. It is only a matter of time before secret plans and operations 
leak out.
Moreover, we do not have the same luxury as the Europeans and 
the British. Their leaders have a virtual blank check (and usually a pri-
vate budget) to spend on foreign policy, paramilitary, and intelligence 
operations. Our European allies in Iraq today are acting in the teeth of 
overwhelming domestic opposition, yet the governments remain in 
office until the next election. This would be impossible in the United 
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States. If a large majority of the American people opposed our pres-
ence in Iraq, the president would be forced to change his policy or to 
resign.
We therefore conduct foreign policy in fits and spasms, not with 
the patient cunning recommended by the grand masters of the art. We 
are more inclined to “a sudden effort of remarkable vigor, than for the 
prolonged endurance of the great storms that beset the political exis-
tence of nations.”7 Our wars are great moral crusades, never strategic 
strokes, and our wars are usually waged until total victory or humiliat-
ing defeat is achieved.
Our best leaders recognize this weakness and try to prepare us for 
the exigencies of international affairs, while our worst give in to our 
weaknesses and make no pretense of serious strategic planning. John 
F. Kennedy began his presidency with a warning of a “long twilight 
struggle,” and promised that America was prepared to sacrifice in 
order to fulfill its Jeffersonian mission. In contrast, Warren Christo-
pher, the first Secretary of State in the Clinton years, convened the 
top officials of the Department of State and told them not to expect 
any strategic vision from the Clinton administration. “We do not have 
one,” he briskly informed the diplomats, “and we do not want one. We 
will simply deal with problems as they arise.” He, his successor, and 
his president were largely true to his words.
This fundamental component of American character is sometimes 
blamed on the emergence of the electronic mass media. It is hard 
for the American public to understand the nuances of world affairs 
when everything is reduced to short sound bites, and when televi-
sion demands pictures in order to cover a story. Furthermore, the very 
nature of the medium often imposes action on politicians even though 
patience might be the wiser course. How can our leaders remain calm 
when the news networks are showing us awful pictures of dreadful 
events? How can we sustain a difficult foreign enterprise when we see 
mass casualties every night? Television may be a cool medium, but it 
generates heated responses and a clamor for action.
James Woolsey, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, has wittily suggested that if modern television reporters had 
accompanied our GIs to the Normandy beaches, we would have been 
forced to withdraw because of the enormous numbers of casualties 
that would have been seen on the evening news.
It’s a tempting argument. Americans love to explain the world by 
referring to some vast, irresistible change—technological innovation, 
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in this case—and certainly the power of the contemporary press rep-
resents a factor in policymaking that was not anticipated by even the 
most thoughtful strategic thinkers a generation or two ago. But when 
Tocqueville says we’re more inclined to feel than to reason, or that we 
are not capable of long-term strategic vision, he is not talking about the 
effect of the evening news. He is talking about the way we are.
All of these factors are at play in our current debate concerning the 
war against terrorism, the struggle I have called the war against the ter-
ror masters. Rarely has any country been so slow to respond to attack 
as we were in this war, which is quite old. Terrorist attacks against the 
United States go back at least twenty-five years, to the Iranian Revolu-
tion of 1979, and ever since, Iran has been near or at the top of the State 
Department’s list of countries that sponsor anti-American terrorism. 
Every American president, starting with Jimmy Carter, has declared 
war against terrorism, but we only began to actually wage that war on 
September 12, 2001.
We have been inundated with analyses of the intelligence failures 
leading to the September 11 massacres, and there were certainly many 
such failures. But the central point is that, prior to the devastating 
attack on American soil, no American president was prepared to 
engage in a real war against our self-proclaimed terrorist enemies. And 
if the policymakers weren’t interested, as night follows day, the Intel-
ligence community wasn’t going to be very interested either.
None of the several committees and commissions that have picked 
apart our intelligence services has drawn attention to this central fact. 
Our spies and analysts do not operate in a vacuum. They know that 
facts are not neutral. Facts and assessments invariably imply policies, 
and the Intelligence community had two-and-a-half decades to learn 
that American presidents weren’t going to wage war against terrorists 
and their state sponsors. This lesson was duly absorbed, often in very 
personal ways. Analysts learned that it was bad for advancement to 
warn excessively about terrorism, and case officers were all too happy 
to avoid the high risks involved in penetrating the terror network or 
the tyrannies that supported it. With every passing year, the Intel-
ligence community knew less and less about terrorism because our 
political leaders didn’t want to hear about it.
The politicization of intelligence is not something that happens only 
when a strong willed, internationally activist president wants justifica-
tion for dramatic undertakings. It also happens when president after 
president doesn’t want to hear alarming news that would oblige him 
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to take politically dangerous action. From Carter to Reagan and Bush 
the Elder to Clinton, every president kicked the terrorist can down 
the road, leaving his successor to pry it open and deal with the nasty 
worms inside. That is the main reason why, despite abundantly avail-
able information, the CIA and the other intelligence agencies did not 
sufficiently warn our presidents about the impending attack on Ameri-
can soil. Once the habits of mind are instilled and spread throughout 
the Intelligence community, it becomes part of their culture.
In the matter of terrorism, it was luminously clear that even the most 
alarming facts were not sufficient to provoke a vigorous response. 
Indeed, even when there was an attack on American soil, at the World 
Trade Center a few weeks after the inauguration of President Clin-
ton, both our political leaders and the Intelligence community strained 
mightily and, in the end, successfully to ignore the import of the fully 
documented fact that the men who tried to kill tens of thousands of 
people in New York City in early 1993—and were quite unlucky to fail, 
by the way—were part of a network that stretched from the Philip-
pines to the Middle East by way of the American heartland. Elements 
of that network were already planning to hijack commercial jetliners 
and crash them into targets in the United States. Not even that knowl-
edge was sufficient to generate aggressive action.
The terror war thus fits the general model. We waited to be 
attacked—attacked not just once but multiple times. We were not 
ready for the new war, and we were surprised when peace didn’t last. 
If you read the literature that appeared after the defeat of the Soviet 
Empire, you will find countless books and monographs declaring that, 
henceforth, military power would be largely irrelevant in international 
affairs because the problems of the future generally would be commer-
cial or economic ones. The destinies of nations would be determined 
by such factors as “economic overreach,” or perhaps by the triumph of 
liberal democracy that had led to a world sufficiently stable to warrant 
the colorful phrase “the end of history.”8
We’re utopian Washingtonians at peace and crusading Jeffersonians 
in wartime, and it’s rare that we are able to think far beyond the pres-
ent moment. We invariably insist that every major conflict ends with 
unconditional surrender and, if possible, with the imposition of Amer-
ican values, from self-determination to liberal democracy. When we 
destroyed the Taliban in Afghanistan, it wasn’t good enough. We had 
to create a democratic Afghanistan. When we removed Saddam Hus-
sein and smashed the Baathist state, that wasn’t good enough either. 
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We had to create a democratic Iraq. These are the requirements of the 
Jeffersonian mission. (Jefferson himself was content to merely defeat 
our enemies on the Barbary Coast. But that was then, when our power 
was limited. Today he’d be a regime-changer. Big time.)
Our Jeffersonian crusades are often wonderful things, as most Japa-
nese and Germans and Italians—and Afghans and Iraqis—will tell 
you. But they are not always a blessing because they leave little room 
for calm judgment. Sometimes it is wise to use power for more lim-
ited objectives in order to avoid a bigger problem in the future. To 
illustrate, Wilson’s grandiose vision of a restructured Europe—to the 
point of redrawing the map of the continent despite previous agree-
ments between our allies—was one of the primary causes of the next 
world war. It would have been wiser to recognize the legitimacy of the 
arrangements that brought Italy into the war,9 and to have been less 
punitive to Germany. A bit of Washingtonian leavening of a Jefferso-
nian loaf can serve us well. But that recipe is almost impossible for us 
to blend.
In like manner, Jeffersonian missions are often wise in otherwise 
Washingtonian times. If we had reacted forcefully and successfully 
against Hizballah in Lebanon after the slaughter of hundreds of Amer-
ican and French marines and diplomats in 1983, then we might well 
have prevented the emergence of the kind of terror network we’re 
fighting today. And, as I have argued for several years now, we have 
frittered away invaluable time with regard to Iran, now on the verge 
of acquiring atomic bombs that the mullahs promise to use against us 
and against Israel. Too much Washington, too little Jefferson.
Our long acquiescence in the terror war fits the Washingtonian 
model, but I don’t think there is any reason to be proud of it. The 
Washingtonian impulse, which gives our enemies the opportunity to 
strike first, has fortunately not yet proven fatal to the nation. But it is 
an extremely dangerous policy because it clearly risks the possibility 
that one day our luck will run out, and a first strike will defeat us.
All this takes us to the ongoing debate over “preemptive war,” the 
critics of which act as if there were some basic principle of international 
law, or some moral principle, that requires us to absorb a first strike 
before the use of military power can be justified. Was our inaction 
before Pearl Harbor proper and noble? Was the Israeli inaction before 
the Yom Kippur invasion admirable? Was Soviet paralysis before the 
Nazi invasion a model for our own foreign policy? There is no such 
principle negating preemption. Yet despite our isolationist impulse, 
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not even we have embraced it, even in the extreme case of nuclear 
weapons. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and many 
West Europeans pressured us to adopt the principle of “no nuclear 
first strike.” Every American president rightly rejected it, because we 
shouldn’t want our enemies to believe they are entitled to land the first 
blow, especially when they have atomic bombs.
*****
Finally, the war against the terror masters fits the model in another 
way. Like the other major conflicts of the past hundred years, it was 
initiated by our enemies, whatever real or imaginary grievances they 
have invoked to justify the decades-long murder of Americans and 
our friends and allies. Inevitably, we are drawn to the question of their 
motives. Why do they hate us? Why do they wish to kill us?
This is a variation of the question, who is our enemy? It is helpful 
to recall that this question, which occupied many of our finest think-
ers throughout the twentieth century, is rarely answered satisfactorily. 
Was the Second World War waged against fascism or against several 
nation-states? I don’t think there are many contemporary scholars who 
still believe that the three members of the Axis—Germany, Italy, and 
Japan—shared a common ideology. Yet we certainly fought them all 
over the world. Was the Cold War waged against international com-
munism or against Soviet imperialism? Or were both wars actually 
waged against a broader evil called totalitarianism? Those debates 
have never been resolved, whether among the community of scholars, 
within NATO, or even within any American administration, but we 
fought all over the planet and even in space. Whatever the still unre-
solved answer to the question, the important policy fact is that when 
we won, the ideology invoked by our enemies vanished. Nothing is so 
devastating to a messianic ideology—and both communism and fas-
cism were intensely messianic—as the defeat of the believers, because 
it demonstrates that the vision was false. The divinity of the emperor, 
the inevitability of the triumph of the proletariat, and the vision of the 
master race all perished with the victory of the West.
As Wittgenstein reminds us, we sometimes ask the wrong question 
and thereby trap ourselves into looking for an answer that doesn’t 
exist, except in the trickery of language. There’s a lot of this in our cur-
rent debates.
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As of the twelfth of September, 2001, we faced a galaxy of terrorist 
groups and four main countries that sponsored the bulk of the terror 
network: Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. What did they have in 
common? Surely not radical Islam, nor even jihadism. The Baathist 
regimes in Syria and Iraq were anything but Islamist. They were secu-
lar socialist regimes. That’s why the West, including the United States, 
liked dealing with them. We thought the Syrian and Iraqi leaders were 
quite like us, which was not the case with the Iranian radical Shi’ites 
or the Saudi Wahabis. Riyadh and Tehran were, and are, the essence of 
radical Islam, the one Sunni, the other Shi’ite.
Yet despite their profound differences, all four countries supported 
anti-American and anti-Western terrorism. All four hated us. Despite 
their differences, they worked together to support a wide variety of 
terrorist organizations, some of them Islamic, some secular, some of 
them Sunnis, others Shi’ites, to a degree that most experts and intel-
ligence officials find shocking in retrospect. It was taken for granted 
(and still is, in some quarters) that the religious, cultural, and political 
divisions within the Middle East were so deep that strategic or even 
tactical alliances were impossible. Sunnis couldn’t work with Shi’ites, 
for example, and the very idea of secular terrorism virtually disap-
peared from the horizon.
If they didn’t share an ideology, what bound them together? As 
in the case of the Axis, they were all tyrannies, and the tyrants were 
united in their common fear and hatred of us, because the very exis-
tence of the United States threatened their legitimacy and undermined 
their authority. Contrary to the popular view of the “Arab street” that 
has been propagated by all too many “blundits,”10 most people in the 
Middle East would rather be free than oppressed. The tyrants know 
that and they know that the American example inspires their people. 
If leaders were elected in the Middle East, and policies were subject 
to the approval of the people, there would be a dramatic reduction in 
support for terrorists. The pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets 
of Iranian cities often carry signs that say, “Don’t talk to us about the 
Palestinians, talk about us.” And huge numbers of Iranians took to the 
streets following the September 11 attacks to mourn for the victims in 
New York and Washington, and repeated their expression of solidarity 
and grief a year later.
To say this is mildly heretical. There is a lot of misguided talk in 
intellectual circles to the effect that democracy is inappropriate to some 
peoples and some countries. They warn that, given a free choice, some 
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countries in the Middle East would chose a fanatical tyrant rather than 
a democratic leader. Perhaps so. It has surely happened in the past 
(Algeria and Iran being two examples, although one might argue that 
the Iranian Revolution wasn’t really a free choice), but those cases are 
few and far between, and the number gets smaller with every passing 
year. For the most part, this theory is just another form of racism, as if 
there were something in the Arabs’ or the Muslims’ DNA that makes 
them incapable of self-government and somehow allergic to freedom. 
It’s quite a preposterous thing to say, since those chromosomically 
and culturally challenged Arabs and Muslims created great civiliza-
tions that preserved scientific knowledge and philosophical wisdom 
at a time when the Europeans, with their presumably superior genetic 
material, were mired in the Dark Ages, soon thereafter to institutional-
ize the Inquisition and the auto-da-fé.
Those who argue for the unique cultural legitimacy of the Muslim 
and/or Arab version of tyranny seem not to know that, in the very 
recent past, Western Europeans with glorious cultural traditions freely 
embraced tyrannies of their own. Hitler and Mussolini were enor-
mously popular. Perhaps the most horrific aspect of German National 
Socialism and Italian fascism was their mass popularity among the 
heirs of Hegel, Beethoven, and Frederick the Great, and Cicero, Augus-
tus, and Verdi. At the time, there were those who believed that there 
was something fundamentally rotten in the German or Italian soul, but 
there are few who believe that today. Why should we believe the heirs 
of Suleiman and Averroes have mutated into malignant monsters inca-
pable of tolerant self-government? And notice, please, that the virulent 
anti-Semitism in which so much of Middle Eastern popular culture is 
now drenched came from Western Europe in the first place. They often 
sound like Nazis because they copied it from the Fuehrer.
The current war is not something dramatically new, something alto-
gether different from previous conflicts. I do not think it is a clash of 
two cultures or civilizations that are fundamentally and irreconcil-
ably at odds with each other. The terror war is just one more exam-
ple of something that has recurred throughout modern history: a war 
between freedom and tyranny. The tyrants attacked us, as they have 
so often in the past, knowing that either they expand the realm of tyr-
anny or they will be swallowed up in the tide of democratic revolution. 
Their actions against us are the ultimate proof that the tyrants are right 
to fear us, and that they fear us for what we are, not for what we do. 
Whether or not there are American troops in Saudi Arabia, whether 
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or not a Palestinian state is created, whether or not Israel exists, the 
tyrants will come after us, as they always have. Our options remain the 
same as ever: we must defeat them or be dominated by them.
In the last two world wars, we recognized the political dimension of 
the conflicts, even if some of the nuances were open to debate. It was 
not necessary to believe that Japan, Germany, and Italy shared a single 
evil vision to know that spreading freedom was central to our victory, 
or that, if we failed, freedom would be crushed wherever our enemies 
prevailed. It should not be difficult to see that the same is true today.
In short, the Jeffersonian mission is the right one in the war against 
the terror masters. Don’t we see it everyday? After the fall of Sad-
dam, there were suddenly pro-democracy demonstrations in the most 
unlikely places, like Syria and Saudi Arabia. Every Middle Eastern 
ruler is now searching for at least the illusion of a reform program that 
will satisfy his people yet keep him firmly on his throne (or in his com-
fortably padded chair). Victory in the war against the terror masters 
means spreading democratic revolution throughout the Middle East. 
Just ask Tom Jefferson.
Victory does not mean Empire now, any more than it did at the end 
of the previous world wars. Americans are not interested in ruling the 
world. We cringe at the very thought. It is quite contrary to the Ameri-
can character and to the American mission. Those who dread and 
those who welcome the American mission, seeing it as a new form of 
imperialism, have both misunderstood America and Americans. Our 
Washingtonian impulse will not permit empire. We don’t want to be 
hegemons. We certainly don’t want to occupy ourselves with the man-
agement of overseas territories or colonies. Indeed, we are incapable of 
it. Our Jeffersonian side will cheer the spread of freedom, but as soon 
as our tyrannical enemies have been defeated we will inevitably lapse 
into our other incarnation. We will clamor to bring the boys home, 
transform guns into butter, and chant the old mantra that peace is nor-
mal and there is no need to prepare for war.
*****
Today, as throughout our history, we are going to pack up and come 
home from the war as quickly as we possibly can. How soon will that 
be? It is likely to be too soon if we continue to focus obsessively on Iraq 
and fail to see the regional and maybe even the global dimensions of 
this war. I am not inclined to believe that this is a fourth world war, 
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but some very smart people believe it, and they may be proven right. 
I have no doubt that we are facing a regional war, and we cannot win 
it so long as the tyrants continue to rule in Damascus, Tehran, and 
Riyadh. I said this long before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
when I wrote that we could not possibly have a free and secure Iraq if 
the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini remained in power across the 
eastern border, and the Stalinist Baathists remained in Damascus, and 
the Wahabis continued to fund terrorism and radical madrasas in Saudi 
Arabia and across the world, including in the United States itself. That 
has been proven accurate. Every day we find more evidence of Syrian, 
Saudi, and Iranian money, weapons, agents, and terrorists in Iraq.
There must be regime change throughout the region. Happily, we 
have the winning weapon against the tyrants. It is not armed invasion 
but democratic revolution. Tocqueville was right when he foresaw that 
America would be the champion of freedom in the world, and that we 
would inevitably have to battle the partisans of tyranny to determine 
the destiny of mankind. He predicted our protracted struggle with 
Russia in 1831, describing it as a war between the two organizing prin-
ciples of human society. He would not be surprised to see us engaged 
in a new war against other tyrants. That has always been our destiny.
Despite our great weaknesses and our celebrated inability to do 
many of the things required by serious foreign policy—such as care-
ful planning for post-war Iraq—we have a good chance to win. Our 
principal adversary in the Middle East is Iran, the country identified 
by the distinctly non-hawkish and non-neoconservative Department 
of State as the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism. No 
one should be surprised to find leading Al-Qaida figures in Iran, both 
before September 11 and after the liberation of Afghanistan from the 
Taliban. Nor should one be surprised at the close Iranian ties of Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi, the Palestinian from Jordan who has become the 
current deus ex machina of the terror war against us in Iraq. Zarqawi has 
operated from Iran for many years, as publicly available court docu-
ments in both Italy and Germany demonstrate. Headquartered in Teh-
ran for several years before September 11, Zarqawi created a European 
network to recruit terrorists for the cause, and organized their travel to 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria for jihad training. Surprisingly little atten-
tion has been paid to Zarqawi’s support from Iran, in part because Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell, in his presentation to the United Nations 
shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom, said that Zarqawi had spent 
time in Baghdad.
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The Israeli government has identified Iran as the principal sup-
porter of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. We have long known that Hizbal-
lah, arguably the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization, is an 
Iranian creation. In addition, Iran has advanced a wildly radical ver-
sion of Shi’ism, in which the traditional separation of mosque and state 
(advocated, for example, by Iraq’s leading Shi’ite cleric, the Ayatollah 
Shirazi) has been scrapped in favor of a theocratic dictatorship gov-
erned by a Supreme Leader who speaks for Allah as well as the nation. 
The defeat of the Iranian mullahs would simultaneously strike a mor-
tal blow at the heart of the terror network and undermine the standing 
of the Iranian theory of Shi’ism. Not least, it would free the Iranian 
people from the murderous oppression of a hated regime.
One cannot find a better example of a society more fully ready for 
democratic revolution than Iran. We brought down the Soviet Empire 
when only a small proportion of its subjects were prepared to openly 
fight for their freedom. In Iran today the overwhelming majority of the 
people (upwards of 70%, according to the regime’s own public opinion 
polls) openly despises the regime and would work for its overthrow, if 
only it had the support of the Western world. We should certainly be 
willing to do for them what we did for the oppressed peoples of the 
Soviet Empire as well as for the Filipinos under Marcos and the Yugo-
slavs under Milosovic. It is not only an imperative for our national 
security but also an imperative for our Jeffersonian impulse. We’re 
prepared to march and spend and declaim and even fight for Haitians, 
Sudanese, and Liberians, and rightly so. Why not for the Iranians?
It doesn’t require armies, it requires money and equipment (like 
satellite phones and radio and television stations) and above all con-
sistent and coherent statements from all our leaders. A free Iran would 
give free Iraq and free Afghanistan a real chance, and serve as a model 
for the rest of the region. Even those who argue the “genetic” theory of 
democracy have a hard time contesting the ability of Iranians to gov-
ern themselves or grasp the subtleties of democracy. Their Constitution 
of 1906 is as thoughtful and sophisticated as anyone could wish. Prior 
to Khomeini’s seizure of power in 1979, Iranian women were the envy 
of the region. Despite the bloody madness of the past quarter century, 
Iranian education remains quite serviceable.
Innumerable objections will be raised against my call for support 
of democratic revolution in Iran. Even many of those who sympathize 
with the goal, with suitable passion and undoubted good faith, contend 
that anything we do to encourage it will only produce greater misery 
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and repression. I heard many of the same objections during the Reagan 
years, when those who supported the president’s clear call for freedom 
for the captive nations and an end to the Soviet Empire were branded 
as hopelessly brainwashed ideologues. Events proved us right, and 
once the Wall fell and people were free to speak their minds, we were 
thanked by the victims of Soviet communism. They told us that once 
they heard Reagan describe the “evil empire” for what it was, they 
gained new hope, and redoubled their efforts to bring it down.
Those willing to fight Soviet communism from within were a small 
minority, both in the Soviet Union and in places like Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Yet, in the end, they were strong enough to win their 
freedom. Given that experience, it seems perverse to argue that free-
dom cannot be won in Iran, where a huge majority of the population 
hates the regime and wishes to be free.
The policy of advancing freedom in Iran is made more urgent by 
Iran’s support of our terrorist enemies and by the mullahs’ relentless 
drive to acquire atomic bombs. But it would be the right policy—the 
very essence of Jeffersonianism—even if there were no war against the 
terror masters, and even if there were no impending nuclear threat. It 
is what we are all about, isn’t it? And it is far better to get on with it 
quickly than to await the first Iranian nuclear test.
That is the American mission as I see it. If we do it well, it will con-
tinue, to the great benefit of peoples who wish to choose their own 
form of government and elect their own leaders. If we fail, the tyrants 
will continue their attacks until they have finally dominated us, which 
is their announced goal. It doesn’t seem a difficult choice. •
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